| Ramadan Revolution | |||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||
| Iraqi Government | Iraqi-cell of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party Iraqi Army |
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| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| Abd al-Karim Qasim † | Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr Abdul Salam Arif |
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| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 5,000 | 80 | ||||||
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The Ramadan Revolution, also referred to as the 8 February Revolution, was a an armed military coup by the Ba'ath Party's Iraqi-wing which overthrew the regime of the Prime Minister of Iraq, Brigadier General Abd al-Karim Qasim in 1963. General Ahmed Hasan al-Bakr became the new Prime Minister and Colonel Abdul Salam Arif became President. Revolutionary leaders and supporters of the coup referred to it as a movement, rather than a coup.
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Some time after the Homeland Officers' Organization, or "Al-Ahrar" ("The Free") succeeded in toppling the monarchy and transforming the Iraqi regime into a republic in 1958, signs of differences between political parties and forces and the Homeland Officers' Organization began when Pan-Arab nationalist forces led by Abdul Salam Arif and the Ba'ath Party called for immediate unification with the United Arab Republic (UAR). In an attempt to create a state of political equilibrium, the Iraqi Communist Party, which opposed unity, tried to discount cooperation with the UAR in economics, culture, and science rather than political and military agreements.
Gradually Abd al-Karim Qasim's relations with some of his fellow members of Al-Ahrar worsened, and his relationship with the unionist and nationalist currents, which had played an active role in supporting the 1958 movement, became strained. As for conflicting currents in the Iraqi Communist Party, they were aspiring for a coalition with General Qasim, and had long been extending their relationship with him, since Qasim thought that some of his allies in the Communist party were coming close to leapfrogging the proposition, especially after the increasing influence of the Communist party in the use of the slogan, proclaimed by many Communists and government supporters during marches: "Long live leader Abd al-Karim and the Communist Party in governing great demand!"[1] This made him from that time begin to minimize the Communist movement, which was poised to overthrow the regime. He ordered the party to be disarmed and most of the party leaders to be arrested. However, the party retained Air Commander Celalettin Alaoqati and Lt. Col. Fadhil Abbas Mahdawi, Qasim's cousin.
An overlapping set of both internal and regional factors created conditions conducive to the overthrow of Prime Minister Abd al-Karim Qasim and his staff. Some believe that it can be attributed to the blundering individualism of Qasim and the errors committed in the execution of leaders and locals as well as acts of violence which arose from the Communist militias allied with Qasim.[2] Also to blame may be an increasingly forceful disagreement with Field Marshal Abdul Salam Aref, who was under house arrest. All of this as well as statements Qasim made reiterating his support for Syrian General Abdel-Karim and Colonel Alnhlaoi Mowaffaq Asasa, with a view to executing a coup to divide Syria, which was alone with Egypt as part of the United Arab Republic. This was because of the game of international politics and its role in the promotion of or endorsement of Qasim's political opposition.
Qasim was aspiring to reach out in a friendly way to the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact to try socialism and develop a strategic defense treaty.
Qasim's removal took place on 8 February 1963, the fourteenth day of Ramadan and therefore called the 14 Ramadan Coup. The coup had been in its planning stages since 1962, and several attempts had been planned, only to be abandoned for fear of discovery. The coup had been initially planned for January 18, but was moved to 25 January, then 8 February after Qasim gained knowledge of the proposed attempt and arrested some of the plotters.
The coup began in the early morning of 8 February 1963, when the communist air force chief, Jalal al-Awqati was assassinated and tank units occupied the Abu Ghrayb radio station. A bitter two day struggle unfolded with heavy fighting between the Ba’athist conspirators and pro-Qasim forces. Qasim took refuge in the Ministry of Defence, where fighting became particularly heavy. Communist sympathisers took to the streets to resist the coup adding to the high casualties.
On 9 February Qasim eventually offered his surrender in return for safe passage out of the country. His request was refused, and on the afternoon of the 9th, Qasim was executed on the orders of the newly formed National Council of the Revolutionary Command (NCRC).[3] Qasim was given a mock trial over Baghdad radio and then killed. His dead body was displayed on television by leaders of the coup soon after his death.
At least 5,000 Iraqis were killed in the fighting from 8–10 February 1963, and in the house-to-house hunt for "communists" that immediately followed. Ba'athists put the losses of their own party at around 80.
The Ba'athist regime was overthrown on 10 November 1963, following internal struggle within the party.
In 1958, General Qasim deposed the Western-allied Iraqi monarchy which had been in power since it was imposed by the British in 1921. The United States government assisted the 1963 coup by supporting Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath Party financially. Writing on the 1963 coup in his memoirs, Harry Rositzke, a long time OSS and CIA intelligence analyst, presented it as an example of Western intelligence agencies attaining good intelligence in contrast to other incidents that caught the agency by surprise. The Ba'ath overthrow "was forecast in exact detail by CIA agents".
"Agents in the Ba'ath Party headquarters in Baghdad had for years kept Washington au courant on the party's personnel and organization, its secret communications and sources of funds, and its penetrations of military and civilian hierarchies in several countries… CIA sources were in a perfect position to follow each step of Ba'th preparations for the Iraqi coup, which focused on making contacts with military and civilian leaders in Baghdad. The CIA's major source, in an ideal catbird seat, reported the exact time of the coup and provided a list of the new cabinet members. ...To call an upcoming coup requires the CIA to have sources within the group of plotters. Yet, from a diplomatic point of view, having secret contacts with plotters implies at least unofficial complicity in the plot."[4]
"Unofficial complicity in the plot" indeed. The CIA would have paid a lot of money for this steady supply of information, especially because American planners had determined that the Ba'ath Party would be the best for U.S. policy in Iraq going forward in 1962.[5] The First Political Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Iraq in 1963 during the coup, Bill Lakeland, has admitted that CIA officer Ed Kane told him that the U.S. “had people who informed us about things…The CIA was kept aware of what was happening…[The CIA] had paid informants within the Ba’ath, but had no control of any operational…It was ultra secret…."[6] Ed Kane was in charge of the Iraq Desk in Washington at the time of the coup.[7] Kane and Lakeland admitted that the CIA team led by Station Chief Art Callahan worked under cover in the Political Section of the Embassy at Baghdad in 1963.[8] The Iraqi Prime Minister Qasim was aware of the U.S. complicity in the plot before the coup and was continually railing against them publicly. The Department of State was worried that Qasim would harass American diplomats in Iraq because of this and so three days before the coup they cautioned the embassy against reacting lest, "Qasim might not proceed to length of expelling various officers of our missions, thus threatenting reduce 'presence' which constitutes important US asset and possible disruption significant intelligence collecting operations."[9]
The most direct evidence of U.S. complicity is a memo from NSC staff member Bob Komer to President John F. Kennedy on the night of the coup, 8 February 1963. The last paragraph reads, "We will make informal friendly noises as soon as we can find out whom to talk with, and ought to recognize as soon as we're sure these guys are firmly in the saddle. CIA had excellent reports on the plotting, but I doubt either they or UK should claim much credit for it."[10]
This financial assistance was valuable, but equally encouraging to the Ba'ath were promises of early recognition and military support.[11] The CIA also provided the list of names of "communists" that the Ba'ath operatives used to gather up potential enemies and torture and kill about 5,000 people in the days immediately following the coup.[12]
That same year, the Syrian party’s military committee succeeded in persuading Nasserist and independent officers to make common cause with it, and successfully carried out a military coup on 8 March. A National Revolutionary Command Council took control and assigned itself legislative power; it appointed Salah al-Din al-Bitar as head of a "national front" government. The Ba'th participated in this government along with the Arab Nationalist Movement, the United Arab Front and the Socialist Unity Movement.
As historian Hanna Batatu notes, this took place without the fundamental disagreement over immediate or "considered" reunification having been resolved. The Ba'ath moved to consolidate its power within the new regime, purging Nasserist officers in April. Subsequent disturbances led to the fall of the al-Bitar government, and in the aftermath of Jasim Alwan’s failed Nasserist coup in July, the Ba'th monopolized power.